Kampala, Uganda – May 27, 2023: Exactly one month ago, a US professor of International Affairs published a research article warning of a future attack on the African Union forces in Somalia.
Prof. Paul D. Williams, who is also an Associate Director of the Masters program in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA, published the article titled “Conventional Insurgents: Understanding al-Shabaab’s Mass Attacks against African Union Bases in Somalia” on April 27, 2023.
The article was published in the academic journal “Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,” which focuses on the causes of terrorism, insurgency, security challenges, and transnational organized crime.
The journal is affiliated with the American Political Science Association and the American Sociological Association.
In the research article, Prof. Williams analyzed the high number of casualties suffered by African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Somalia during al-Shabaab attacks on their forward operating bases (FOBs) between June 2015 and January 2017. By comparing six major battles, the study identified the factors contributing to the vulnerability of peacekeepers and the military successes of al-Shabaab. The findings have implications for peace operations facing similar insurgent threats in Somalia and beyond.
The article emphasized the need for an improved understanding of asymmetric warfare tactics, enhanced security measures for peacekeepers, and strategic adaptations in peacekeeping operations. The details provided in the article could be invaluable not only to Uganda, the largest troop-contributing country to AMISOM but also to other nations within the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia and the Somali security forces.
Unfortunately, on Friday morning, al-Shabaab militants carried out an attack on a military base housing Ugandan forces of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The attack occurred in Bulamarer, located 130km southwest of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that suicide bomb attacks resulted in the killing of 137 soldiers.
In response, the Ugandan army condemned the attack and dispatched a team, led by Land Forces Gen. Kayanja Muhanga, to assess the situation. Somali security forces and international partners also conducted airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab militants allegedly involved in the attack.
Background to the study:
Prof. Williams conducted research on six previous attacks on AU forces, which served as case studies for his study. Based on these cases, he drew conclusions regarding the vulnerabilities and shortcomings of AU forces:
According to his findings, between 2015 and 2017, five attacks occurred, with four resulting in the overrunning of the base and one being repelled with significant al-Shabaab casualties. After a gap, al-Shabaab launched another attack in May 2022. These attacks targeted FOBs in different sectors and involved specific tactics employed by al-Shabaab. The battles highlighted various vulnerabilities within AU forces and led to assessments and changes in defensive procedures.
The specific attacks:
Leego: June 2015
Al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM’s FOB at Leego, garrisoned by Burundian troops. The attackers used a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) to breach the base’s defenses, followed by infantry waves supported by “technicals.” The base was overrun within hours, resulting in the death of 54 Burundian soldiers.
Janaale: September 2015
In September 2015, al-Shabaab launched an attack on the Ugandan-manned FOB in Janaale. The attack followed a similar pattern, involving a suicide VBIED and coordinated infantry assaults. The Ugandan troops fought for several hours but eventually ran out of ammunition and had to retreat. Reinforcements from AMISOM arrived approximately 8 hours later. The attack resulted in 19 reported Ugandan fatalities, and some soldiers were taken hostage by al-Shabaab.
El Adde: January 2016
In January 2016, al-Shabaab overran the Kenyan-manned FOB in El Adde. The base had a large perimeter and a small garrison, making it difficult to defend. The attackers utilized suicide VBIEDs, and infantry assaults, and targeted nearby communication infrastructure. The base was captured, and al-Shabaab seized equipment and took an unknown number of Kenyan soldiers as hostages. The estimated number of Kenyan fatalities was over 160.
Halgan: June 2016
In June 2016, al-Shabaab targeted the Ethiopian-manned FOB in Halgan. The Ethiopian forces received an early warning from local sources and prepared their defenses accordingly. With the support of aviation from Ethiopian and UN helicopters, they repelled the attack. The battle resulted in Ethiopian casualties of 20-40, while al-Shabaab suffered significant losses.
Kulbiyow: January 2017
In January 2017, al-Shabaab attacked the Kenyan base at Kulbiyow. The assault involved a large number of fighters and employed similar tactics. The base was initially overrun, but Kenyan forces launched a counterattack and regained control. The battle resulted in casualties on both sides.
According to Prof. Williams, these attacks exposed vulnerabilities within AMISOM, including inadequate defenses, lack of coordination between national contingents, and insufficient intelligence.
The study employed a structured focused comparison case study method to analyze the reasons behind al-Shabaab’s battlefield successes. It highlighted the adaptability and force employment of al-Shabaab, as well as vulnerabilities in the AU’s organization and troop deployment.
The study draws on extensive research conducted over 15 years, utilizing internal documents, unpublished materials, and interviews with AU, international, and Somali officials. It provides empirical details of the battles, including casualty estimates, similarities, and differences. The analysis examines the AU’s organization and forces employers to identify vulnerabilities in FOBs, while also exploring al-Shabaab’s successes, emphasizing their organizational adaptability, innovative tactics, and force employment.
Based on the findings, Prof. Williams outlines four lessons for the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and similar operations facing conventional attacks:
Prioritize small, temporary bases with frequent reconnaissance and patrolling rather than aiming for territorial control.
Ensure close air support and the ability to rapidly deploy reinforcements in remote static FOBs.
Implement effective countermeasures by adjusting strategies based on the tactics employed by the enemy, such as increasing garrison sizes or improving perimeter security.
Build positive relationships with local populations to enhance intelligence gathering and early warning systems.
The article concludes that al-Shabaab’s success can be attributed to its organizational adaptability, exploitation of sanctuaries, strategic and tactical surprise, tactical innovation, and effective intelligence gathering. It also highlights the challenges faced by AMISOM, including dispersed and poorly defended forces, lack of aviation support, disjointed command and control, and poor local engagement.
What contributes to AU’s Force Vulnerability?
Prof. Williams’ study summarizes eight significant characteristics of the AU’s force employment that continue to contribute to vulnerabilities in forward operating bases (FOBs).
He also sets the political and military context in which al-Shabaab overran five of these bases previously, on top of al-Shabaab’s organizational strengths and force employment methods.
1. Dispersed forces:
Prof. Williams opines that since early 2012, when AMISOM expanded its operations beyond Mogadishu, the mission adopted a highly dispersed force posture over a vast area. With approximately 21,000 troops deployed across six sectors in south-central Somalia, AMISOM operated numerous small, static, and isolated bases vulnerable to attack. The lack of rapid reinforcement capabilities and effective air support further exacerbated the vulnerability of these bases.
2. Small forces:
Williams further says that most of the AU’s FOBs were garrisoned by a company or company plus standard, meaning they had between 100 and 200 troops defending against al-Shabaab’s mass attacks. In contrast, al-Shabaab mustered between 400 and 500 fighters for their major attacks on AU FOBs. Although there were directives to increase the number of troops and establish Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), these measures were not fully implemented.
3. Static forces:
He adds that major attacks on AU FOBs occurred after AMISOM ceased offensive operations against al-Shabaab. AU forces became tethered to their FOBs, while al-Shabaab enjoyed relative freedom of movement. This limited AU’s ability to secure main supply routes and made convoys susceptible to IEDs and ambushes.
4. Poorly defended forces:
Prof. Williams says AMISOM was under-resourced, lacking the necessary capabilities to cover its large area of operations. Perimeter defenses of the FOBs were often rudimentary and insufficient, relying on basic barriers such as HESCO barriers, barbed wire, and thorn bushes. The defenses did not stop Al-Shabaab’s attacks, and AU forces often defaulted to a defensive “barracks mode” rather than actively patrolling and dominating the surrounding area.
5. Ground(ed) forces:
According to the study, AMISOM initially lacked an aviation component, relying solely on land-based forces. The delayed deployment of helicopters and limited air support capability hindered AU forces in providing convoy close protection, striking al-Shabaab forces, and deploying rapid response forces.
6. Disjointed forces:
The operational autonomy of national contingent commanders within AMISOM resulted in a lack of coherent command and control. Multinational operations and coordinated deployments across sectors were challenging, leaving boundaries between sectors as relatively safe terrain for al-Shabaab.
7. Unadaptable forces:
The study says AMISOM failed to adapt and implement effective countermeasures against al-Shabaab’s evolving tactics. While al-Shabaab’s earlier attacks on FOBs were generally ineffective, the militants perfected their tactics while AMISOM did not adequately adjust its strategies.
8. Poor local engagement:
The study further concludes, AU forces often had poor relations with Somali security forces and local civilian populations. Mistrust between AMISOM and Somali forces hindered effective cooperation, limiting patrolling, and language barriers impeded interaction with the local population. These factors undermined the gathering of intelligence on al-Shabaab activities.
What Makes al-Shabaab Attacks Succeed
According to Prof. Williams, the case studies clearly demonstrate Al-Shabaab’s ruthless exploitation of the African Union’s vulnerabilities, resulting in the overrun of five FOBs, the likely death of over 450 peacekeepers, significant theft of military equipment, and the production of extensive propaganda videos.
Accordingly, the following factors make the militants enjoy an advantage over the AU forces:
One; Organizational adaptability: Prof. Williams argues, that the most fundamental strength of al-Shabaab is its flexible and adaptable organization. From 2006 to 2011, the group aimed to control and govern large territories, including parts of the capital city, until being driven out of Mogadishu in late 2011. Over the following years, AU and Somali forces reclaimed numerous settlements from al-Shabaab. However, by 2015, al-Shabaab had effectively adapted to new circumstances. It established governance systems, exploited local populations, engaged in transnational criminal activities, and combined guerrilla warfare tactics with specialized battalions for conventional assaults on AU bases. This organizational versatility allowed al-Shabaab to engage vulnerable AU FOBs at their chosen time and location.
Two; Sanctuary exploitation: Al-Shabaab demonstrated adeptness in controlling populations and operating across vast areas of Somali territory and international borders. The success of their mass FOB attacks relied on exploiting localized sanctuaries for the training, preparation, and mobilization of their forces. These sanctuaries provided opportunities for taxation, military operations, training, safe passage for support networks, and the supply of resources. Al-Shabaab capitalized on poor coordination between AU troop-contributing countries and Somali authorities, enabling them to maintain their offensive capabilities and conduct thorough reconnaissance of AU bases.
Three; Strategic and tactical surprise: Al-Shabaab’s ability to surprise the enemy was instrumental in their overrunning of AU FOBs. At the tactical level, their major FOB attacks typically occurred just before dawn, utilizing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to catch defenders off guard. The element of strategic surprise was also present, as AMISOM initially failed to anticipate the possibility of FOB overruns until shortly before they occurred. Al-Shabaab exploited this lack of preparedness, while AMISOM’s assessment underestimated the group’s organizational flexibility. The ability to surprise opponents allowed al-Shabaab to achieve its objectives effectively.
Four; Tactical innovation: Al-Shabaab learned from its failed attacks on Kenyan AMISOM bases in 2012 and 2013, leading to the development of tactics that proved highly effective. Their approach involved launching attacks on AU FOBs before dawn, employing surprise VBIEDs followed by mass waves of infantry, technical vehicles, and obstruction measures. The use of IEDs and anti-aircraft guns further complicated AU reinforcements. Notably, al-Shabaab consistently deployed larger forces than the defenders, often maintaining a 3:1 numerical advantage. However, when they deviated from this tactic, such as in the unsuccessful attack on the Ugandan FOB at Buulo Mareer, their forces were repelled due to insufficient troop numbers.
Five; Effective intelligence: Al-Shabaab’s collection of actionable intelligence on AU forces played a crucial role in planning and executing mass attacks. They possessed knowledge of AU force locations, activities, rotations, timetables, and supply routes. This information was obtained through local sources, connections with local populations, and infiltration of Somali security forces, granting them insights into the AU’s operational secrets. Armed with this intelligence, al-Shabaab selected battles they were confident of winning, ensuring the element of surprise and a comprehensive understanding of
Lessons for the Future
Prof. Williams argued in April that al-Shabaab continued to pose a threat, although their attacks on AU and Somali FOBs are mostly small-scale probing attacks.
Compared to its predecessor AMISOM, ATMIS had experienced fewer casualties, primarily due to al-Shabaab increasingly targeting Somali security forces.
However, between May 6, 2022, and February 2023, al-Shabaab managed to kill nine ATMIS peacekeepers and wounded 60 more, mainly using IEDs and mortar fire.
“Furthermore, many ATMIS FOBs are still guarded by fewer than two companies of troops, making them vulnerable to mass attacks,” he wrote.
Based on the study’s analysis, Prof. Williams left four lessons that could be derived to assist peacekeepers and national militaries in avoiding the AU’s fate in Somalia.
First; those responsible for commanding peace operations or counterinsurgency campaigns should only establish small, remote, and static FOBs if there is a clear strategic utility. As seen in Somalia, aspirations of territorial control proved fatal for troops stationed in several FOBs. Whenever possible, missions should prioritize temporary bases with shorter lifespans, coupled with frequent long-range reconnaissance and patrolling. This necessitates the inclusion of protected mobile units and relevant reconnaissance capabilities.
Second; in hostile environments like south-central Somalia, if static FOBs are established in remote locations, the mission must ensure close air support and the ability to rapidly deploy reinforcements in the face of an attack or imminent threat. Establishing remote FOBs without effective Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) is a recipe for disaster. In Somalia, the AU force lacked the capability to muster land-based QRFs and a suitable aviation component, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by al-Shabaab.
Third; once the tactics employed in such attacks are understood, missions must implement effective countermeasures. In the AU’s case in Somalia, this could involve either closing the most remote FOBs in favor of larger garrisons and long-range patrolling or increasing the garrison size on remote FOBs to at least two companies. Furthermore, improving perimeter security and tactical defenses at bases should align with standardized FOB designs approved by the mission’s chief force engineer.
Fourth; establishing positive relationships with local populations is crucial for intelligence gathering and early warnings of potential attacks. Peacekeepers should actively engage with local communities, demonstrating their support and finding ways to collaborate productively. This approach includes regular patrols and maintaining control over the surrounding area, avoiding a defensive “barracks mode” as described by the UN Monitoring Group.
About AMISOM:
The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been the largest, costliest, and deadliest peace operation conducted by the AU. Over 22,000 uniformed personnel were deployed to protect Somali authorities from al-Shabaab militants and facilitate peace and reconciliation efforts.
The study estimates that more than 3,500 peacekeepers lost their lives between 2007 and 2022, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being the main cause. However, major al-Shabaab assaults on FOBs resulted in approximately 450 AU troops being killed and many more injured.
While al-Shabaab previously held significant territory in Somalia, they shifted to asymmetric tactics after being driven out of urban areas by AU and Somali forces. The group developed tactics for large-scale attacks on AU bases, resulting in significant casualties and the acquisition of military resources. Such attacks are rare in peace and counterinsurgency operations, making Somalia an exceptional case.
To read the full research article by Prof. Williams, click on: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2207234
Is a longtime journalist in Uganda who has served as a cab reporter, Bureau Chief, Managing Editor, and Digital Media Editor at the country's prominent publications such as Daily Monitor, Red Pepper, and now, Research Finds News since 1999.
Rugyendo is currently a Ph.D. Fellow in Journalism and Communication at Makerere University, a Desmond Tutu Fellow, Crans Montana New Leader, and Chairman of Young Engineers Uganda and Uganda Premier League.
